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fiq the ncrtli , wioAerdbftier' elewtftfcffi , fec « iiidedr ton'the Twstbyihe Caweoing--Bay , and < Mk « tthe inorth by * be > sgreat-haifcttur , t « fida © oking to > the southeast' into ? th&works © n rtbe-rig&t of ithe Allies . I 3 ? be "Prench now 'bold the extreme iright beyood' Gordon ' s Battery , and It rsoon became evident to ' the Russians thatthey intended to ptfsh f'their approaches both towards the head of ' tbe ' great ' harbour , and towards the Maiakoff Tower . In feet , Tedoubts were -thrown up on the rising ground'looking down
on the harbour ; and the fire from a British battery , not long since , drove off three steamers from their position on our flank , and sank one . The Russians , alarmed at these menacing advances , adopted bold measures , seized % [ ottnt Sapoume , the'hill on their extreme left , quickly threw up a work there , and beat off the Zouaves in their daring assault upon that redoubt . From this height the Russians overlook our works , and the approach to it as covered by a converging fire from the
batteries across the head of the harbour , as well as from the main line of defence . Not satisfied with this , and foreseeing j the great danger they would incur by yielding to the French advance , the enemy seized the Mamelon in advance of Maiakoff , and established a redoubt there . 'This skilful operation enabled the enemy to dig pits for his sharpshooters right and left of the mound , in such positions as to enfilade the British right , and to sting the French in front with a constant and galling , fire . So that the occupation of the Mamelon is a measure of defence , not , as has been represented , a measure of offence ;
the object of the Russians in seizing it was not to gain ground upon us , but to meet , and repel , if possible , the effort to gain ground upon them . For the possession of these pits and the works on this hillock there have been several sanguinary struggles , in whieh the Russians have displayed true soldierly , qualities , and have disputed the ground with great hardihood and success . The whole of the recent conflicts have had for their object , on one side to retain , on the other to obtain , this hill . As the French , in spite of their defeats really , gained ground daily , and as it was obvious the Allies could not suffer the
enemy to hold this'advanced post * the Russians , in anticipation , made a strong sortie on the night of the 22 nd of March , leaping- suddenly upon the Allies , from Chapman ' s Battery to the French right : a fierce combat ensued in the trenches ; the Russians turned the advanced parallels , and the French and British charging at the pohit of the bayonet , and " pitching them over the parapets , " swept them back to their own lines . Following close , our daring allies chased the enemy even as far as the Round Tower . The result was great loss on both sides ; but the French seized and held some of the rifle pits so obstinately contested .
2 . As to the north side . —Hero the enemy is stronger than ever . A line of entrenchments reach from the'Belbek to the head of the harbour , form the outworks of the Russian camp , and grimly enclose the large Star Fort , and the batteries on tho sea face . From the head of the harbour westward , every cliff haa its battery looking towards tho Allies , and commanding tho road along the opposite shore . On the plateau above the second Inkerman Light ,
• the Russian divisions there encamped have flanked their position with abattis , and over the ruins of Inkerman batteries hayo been established . Still further cast , we find the summit of the steep defile leading up to Mackenzie ' s Farm from the Tchernaya , defended by earthworks iihat sweep tho road 5 while , below tho defile , Strong works have been constructed to bar" tho ' passage of the ' Tehenmya 1 either at Tchorgoun 1 0 rTraktir . Awd , Orosamg"tho 'Tohernaya , -we -find the old Russian encampment at 'Kamata
> sfctllifed& « by ithej » aefiiy . « WIft * oer the * $ nem ; y ^ ill fbei £ « bfe ** o sftttin ' tthtae "etttenaife * l * nes is quifeeoanother quG ** ion . ' ' 3 . : $ ks txMke& 13 ito > . — : ^ Therefore , ia any'field operations , ~ the Allies must either face the passage of the Tchemaya , > under a heavy fire , or ttrm it by a - march through ¦ the country to the East : 'by'no . other mode , except by reenrfbarkinga pi » tionof" 8 he force , and operating upon another line , © an they'penetrate into the country . Their- present position , from Balakiava to Inkerman , is'now impregnable ; but
locomotion seems « s difficult to them as holding their ground'is fca " sy . 'The Turks still hold'Eupatoria , -watched ' by a seemingly large Russian tforce , 'under Prittee R'AJ > zivlll . Omar Pacsha ^ has visited the' © affip of-the Allies , and has re-1 turned to his pdst . Whether itbe true as rumour Teports / that he h&a'inarched upon Saki , in the direction of "Simpheropol , or not , "some movement of tKis sofrt , in combination ' with an Anglo-French advance upon the ' Belbek , would seem to be on the cards ; and also another line of separate ' operations which we refrain 'from indicating .
It is always ' difficult , 'often impossible , to understand the ex-act position of affairs in war . A day , an hour , a change of commanders , temper , too' much or too little wine , may change the whole aspect 6 f a campaign . We can unfortunately only judge by results . But it is not possible to deny that'the present aspect of the war is extremely unsatisfactory , If Sebastopolwere taken by-assault it could only be paTtially retained ; if the siege were to be raised , the Allies must leave behind their artillery , stores , and ammunition- If they enter on a tsampaign in the country , they will have enormous difficulties to surmount , because
in the field they have lost the initiative , and are badly supplied with cavalry . It is true that if they seized , they could make Sebastopol untenable , and the harbour impassable by means of a few batteries ; and if this were done , the whole of the army not required for the south side , might be directed against the north side . Whether the south side can be reduced is the practical problem that the Allies are now engaged in solving ; but beyond this , military authorities concur in the positive necessity for . ulterior operations .
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THE SINS OF THE " SYSTEM . " It is impossible to avenge the lost army of the Crimea by loading any public man , or set of men , with the odium of its destruction . Blame attaches in many places- —perhaps infamy somewhere ; but though neglect or incapacity have been proved against a few miserable
understrappers , the result of the Parliamentary inquisition has hitherto been to clear particular administrators of much that had been rancourously or hastily imputed to them , and to lay open , under the framework of our official system , the sources of those evils by which our troops have suffered , and by which our reputation has been stained . For ourselves , we have
always hesitated to ascribe culpability so enormous to any individual ; it has been too hard for us to believe that an English statesman would recklessly abandon an 'English army to famine and disease ; and Mr . Roimucit ' s Committee has elicited very much to ex'culpate the late Ministers from the guilt of practices forming part of a system of which ono of tho chief evils was that it rendorod them helpless , arid made them the slaves and victims of its corrupt routine .
When we have said this , wo are more at liberty to say , that tho -nation should feel degraded by these revelations , so hideous , so incomprehensible , so afflicting . Tho public Ministry , confided without jealousy to the hands of one predominant class , has been so abused , that thousands of men , dismissed to a
distant campaign , have -escaped the fire 'and swottl ; of war , ; aad ' 'periabea 'in ; agonies ? ia Britishcamps « ad ' ho $ piftaig . Nothing' appears more unanswerably demonstrated than that Our governing orders , after forty ' years' leiBore , have learned no new atts of ' military administration , and are radically'incompetent to C | bnduct a war . Follow the Eastern 'expedition from our coasts'to Sebastopol , and , step by step , error , ^ failures , neglect , and senility keep 'pace with its movements , until the inglorious parallel ends in an hospital , with soldiers dying from change of diet , ordered by mistake .
Abstaining , as carefully as possible , from stigmatising individuals until their actions can be criticised in strict relation to their responsibilities and to their necessities , we may mark the lines by which delay and hurry went on together , with blunders signalising almost every action , deficiencies in every supply , confusion in : every department , disaster at every stage of progress . Perhaps no mistake was
more prolific of ill than the inveterate tenacity with which our "Ministers clung to the hope of peace . Sir DeLactEvms deposed that all things seemed to be managed under a persuasion that there « would be no fighting , that magazines would be - unnecessary , that wounds would not be suffered , that a Note would come from Vienna and restore the world to peace . Many of the officers in command laughed at the thought of a real war ; it is known that a son of Lord Aberdeen talked at Varna about
the absurdity of going * so far without a genuine object . Moreover , when these optimist deceptions had vanished , the nature of the service was mistaken . The army was provided as if it were destined to operate in a civilised country , where villages would abound , and where materials would be forthcoming to meet the exigencies of the season . Spain lingered in the memory of many ^ an untaught campaigner . Thus the ignorance of " the system , " a $ well
as-the fatuity -of the Cabinet , sent our forces unprepared to their severe and deadly work . We shall not enlarge here on that infirmity of purpose which yielded to the counsels of Marshal St . Aknaujd , trying to outstrip death , and to find far himself an atoning grave . These are serious points ; yet they do not explain the horrors of the Crimean campaign—horrors inexplicable , unless . we connect jhena mth the system out of which they sprang .
The long European peace saw England competing with other countries in experimental feats of arms . It was supposed that military science had advanced , and that fleets would sail , and armies as well , with an organisation too perfect to admit of shortcomings , blunders , or delay . But the siege of Sebastopol was undertaken by an army almost as ill-equipped
as that which , without a sapper or miner , invested and captured thirteen cities of Spain . Bad clothing , bad implements , and bad food were provided . The iron tools splintered after three or four blows on green wood or on hard earth . Had they been supplied without trial , there would have been neglect ; but they had been tried and condemned at Chobham , and
were recklessly given out . Chobham was , professedly , a test ; then how m onstro us to def y the consequences of this test , to employ machines which it had proved to be useless ! But , as if to forbid tho chance of happy accidents , oven these wretched tools were scantily allowed . A regiment camo to the ickaxes and spadeall
Crimea with two p one - broken . A hospital at Scutari , intended for tho reception of live hundred nnm , was suppled witli two bottles of port wine . » Green coffee became a malignant proverb in the camp . Stoics of planks were shipped for hutting , but no nails . Ships were laden with gram , ' bnt mo sacks . Some of tho regimental medieine-chejta were found to bo empty . Amputating irttple-
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), April 7, 1855, page 323, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2085/page/11/
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