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defects Sntfeeimta&aag "tools nwre at an early period brought Tinder 'Ms -Grace ' s . notice 4 n » ipriwate -letter , . and he 4 eoked"opon tii&t as bo very important a matter 43 iat he Immediately "wrote to the Ordnance department , desiring ito have "a thorough investigation of it . "They repeated to 'him in a manner which he thought was tmsafisfaetory , and he sent their report to ; Lord Raglan , and'asked him whether there was any troth in it . I-ord Ragian instituted inquiries , and wrote to him ( witness ) to « ay that many of "the tools-were of a very inferior character . By means of a second inquiry , instituted at his request fey the -Ordnance authorities , it was found out thatthe objectionable tools had been made at the outpoTt 9 > dep 6 ts , and were of a very antiquated description . ( A-faugh-. ") He then intimated to the Ordnance that the transaction was a very reprehensible one , and hoped that there 'would be no repetition of It .
Referring to the assertion that Lord Raglan disapproved of the expedition to Sebastopol , the Duke said that the very contrary was the fact . Speaking of himself officially , he said he had not a deficiency of power , ¦ but a deficiency of means . In order to enable any Secretary of State for War to carry out his duties satisfactorily to himself and the public , there must be very material changes in all the war departments . He was hampered by his subordinates . He was bound to say , however , that everybody under him evinced the greatest cordiality , and made the greatest efforts to do their duty . He did not attach blame to any individual , but he thonght the system was bad .
WEDNESDAY . The examination of the Duke of Newcastle was concluded on Wednesday , when his testimony consisted mainly of an amplification of his previous evidence . The chief additional points may be briefly summarised . He said the responsibility of authorising expenditure was conferred on Lord Stratford de Redcliffe because he had the means of obtaining all requisite supplies from the Turkish Government ; but it was not intended that he should personally interfere with the hospital . Generally speaking , -the witness was dissatisfied with the organisation of the medical department , of the Ordnance , and of the Commissariat . At an « arly period he anticipated
that the ¦ system of sea-transport would fee found ^ defective in its working in time of war . It ~ was hnpossible-to have any fixed idea as to the arrangements necessary for the-wintering of the army in the Crimea so long as the result of the siege was unknown ; but admirable winter quarters , Sebastopol being taken , might have been had in the south of the Crimea , or the Bosphraras , and , said the witness , " I provided for both contingencies . " Immediately afterwards , however , his G * aee observed , in answer to the Ghairman , that "he could not say" whether he had provided for the contingency of Sebastopol not being taken . " Because , " -added the Chairman , " that contingency has happened . " At which there was some laughter .
5 The more extensive scheme of organisation in the War Departments proposed by the witness as Minister of War was overruled by the cabinet . It was determined .-by _ 1 &e _ cabine . t , jthat _ noth ^ ^^ should be done beyond "the separation of the two secretaryships and ^ he removal of "the -Commissariat from the Treasury . It wvt&d have been of the greatest importance to the public -service if -those arrangements had been made before the breaking out -of the war ; but he was of opinion that "the greatest difficulty and mischief would -ensue if extensive alterations were made at a period when ft was necessary for every one to be working as hard as he could . Although the system might be faulty , yet there were moments when it was almost preferable to continue far a short time a faulty system than to adopt a better one ,-which would take two or three months , or a longer time , to get into gear .
The Chairman then read a communication relative to the supply and construction of the huts for the Crimea , by Messrs . Price and Cotter , representing that they sent in their plans and specifications to the authorities , but received no communications for several- weeks , and that when they applied to the Ordnance their plans and specifications were lost , and they were requested to f unriah fresh -ones ; that the Duke afterwards ordered them , on his own personal responsibility , to make the huts , but that a peremptory order afterwards came from the Ordnance , telling them to stop the works ; that the Duke again ordered them to go on on his own -responsibility ; and that the huts were finished and reached the Crimea otijy when they ceased to be wanted , and thousands of men and horses were lost owing to the delay .
'The Duke— - " That statement , as is too often the case , is » "very highly-coloured one in many respects . I never heard Hwrt the plans had been lost ; but that the Ordnance isent word to stop the works , is true . Differences of-opinion arose as to the proper form of -their conBknwtlon , and the 'Ordnance sent , to stay the works until that point was determined ; but that the delay , which was otny * two or three days , entailed disasters I utterly deny . His true , the hats arrived late in the Crimea ; but they wwro in ample time to save the troops from disaster . " v No-tWlaytook place in the contracts for tho'Minie ' rlftes , but , great dfilay occurred in the execution . of those contracts . One of the 'first eubjecta to which he turned lite Jfttemflon on 'becoming Minister for War -was the sojgQy of'the'Mhiie ' rrfks and < rther small arms ; and , in aimseqpenc * 0 t the 'delay in the tnanufaoturo of those
aims , ^ euttdartd : ft 5 , O 0 ft : rifiaB tonbe ^ mMBrtwcfauadiat Liege , which had Ae affiwt , amng < o 4 feexs , ** preohtdiag themamifectuiersr- * iiereiwHn executingai large ordertfbr rifles'fijr the-. Bnamro goTEraaaent , which twas given just after-witness had ordered Hihemtd make the 25 , 000 xifles for Ithe English troops . ( Jl laugh . ) He found such dmlcidties in getting the Birmingham anaanttfacfcnrers to supply > the contracts for small -anns , « ihat he was obliged to go to Liege far them . There was mo meeting of ithe Cabinet in August after the -prorogation of Parliament , or in September , although that was an exceedingly important piriod of the campaign . The lowest state of the ; army was on the 19 th January , when the total effective ibrce of all arms , including rank and file and officers and . non-commissioned officers , amounted to 26 ; 080 . On the 23 rd December , the total effective force ,
including officers and non-commissioned officers , vaa 29 , 921 . In conclusion , his Grace reiterated his opinion that our military system ought to be reformed . He thought that the whole staff system of the army in this country is-erroneous . His belief was that we ought to have a-staff of the aimy something like that of thecontmental . armies ; without that , the evils of the existing system would never be ^ removed . He had reason to believe * hat considerable advantage would be obtained by an examination of the French military system , and from the assimilation of our own to it as > much as possible . Some time ago , with that view , he appointed a 'commission composed of three officers , to make -inquiries into the subject -upon the spot ; and he believed those gentlemen hsdrmade their report to his successor in office , Lord Panmure .
THURSDAY . The earlier part of the sitting on Thursday was occupied in . hearing explanations from ' Mr . Potter , of the firm of Potter and Price , relative to the hots supplied for the army in the Crimea . These substantiated the statements given before the committee on the previous day . It Appeared that the order to construct the huts was given by ; the Duke of Newcastle , but that avast amount of time was lost in consequence of Sir Frederick Smith ' s perpetnaily telegraphing on the subject between London and Gloucester , first , o » untermanding the order , then altering the construction of the Jiuts , and finally in ordering them to be loaded and sent out . Theirotswere built upon the Portsmouth and Gloucester system , ^ nd
also on _ a modification of both . The contract-was finally finished on the 11 th of December ; but no definite orders were given to the contractors as to whether the huts should be made on the Portsmouth or the Gloucester plan . The diversity of plans adopted increased the expense to 21 . 10 s . per house more . The first contract price of the huts was 251 . per hut , and each hut weighed 2 tons 8 owt . The Ordnance , by" the alterations , added to the weight and expense of the huts , but not to the accommodation . He experienced a difficulty in obtaining his money . There was a dispute which was finally settled by Mr . Hayter , of the Treasury .
Each hut was calculated to contain twenty men . Witness ' s firm subsequently -supplied 1850 similar huts to the French Government , and the contract was completed in- * ve ~ iweek&—There -appearedutobea ^ grefttjconlusion of jurisdiction in the transactions he had in this matter with the various war -departments . The Trench thus were cheaper and lighter than the English ; there was less material , > aa& they were more serviceable , though a little lower . There-wis mot bo much cubic space in them , which n / ras to avoid the heavy winds about Balaklava ; and they were very much easier to fee taken up in front for the troops .
Depxity Commissary-General Smith -said he was stationary at Constantinople , and his duties were to act upon all orders » ent from the Crimea by the . Commissary-General . He established stores and magazines at Constantinople , which possibly could not be seen by those who had said there Tvere no stores , as they were under the barracks in one case , and in another two miles from Constantinople . They contained largo quantities-of provisions , salt meat , rum , and other supplies , and . there wore two extensive granaries on the Asiatic side of the liosphorufi . He never experienced any -inconvenience from the forms , or complaints from the officers in the army on the « core of forms , and eonld not suggest a more simple one than that in use 'for provisions'and rations . With respect to the issuing of green coffee , he said it was never the practice of the Commissariat to issue it in any other than a raw state ; and that he
heard only a few isolated instances of complaint . He was not ordered immediately to send cattle -from Constantinople , 'but onfty after the hurricane at Balaklava . There was no difficulty in obtaining thorn , there being large quantities in reserve at 'Constantinople . The hurricane -very seriously crippled , by delay , the operations of tho Commissariat . In consequence of the wreck of the vessels , and owing to it , the troops -were left without fresh meat at Constantinople . I The delay that took -place in the case of tho Harbinger , : employed to convey vegetables . to Balaklava , which : delay resulted in the whole or the greater part of those vegetables being spoiled , ho attributed chiefly to Admiral SBoscer in detaining the ship unnecessarily long in the Golden Horn . Admiral Boxer -was tho -supreme ; naval authority at Constantinople . There-was an English harbour-master at 'Constantinople , . but he had no control over the navhl "transport . 'He tvao'not able to
send « dlifee charcoal he was . ashed ibr , owing to £ he want of transport , though « he had treason to beKera that at 4 hafe * ime vessels ^ were lying at Balaklava doing nothing . Witness then Tead a . letter he wrote on the 28 td November to > Commissary General Filder complaining of the -want -of transport ; a passage of which—b tating that ' . ' Admiral Boxer was a confused man , and that the shipping oDaasterswho came to Constantinople had neithe r respect for nor fear of him" —created considerable amusement . He regretted he had not copies of the letters he wrote to Admiral Boxer from time to time importunW
him to meet the wants of the service , which , unfortunately , the admiral characterised as a bore . ( Laughter . } He attributed most Of the great delays and difficulties in the sea transport of the commissariat stores to Admiral Boxer . He must , however , say Admiral Boxer had an incomplete staff ; added to that , his duties were excessive ; but he had not the-administrative genius necessary for conducting such difficult and complicated duties as devolved upon him . Witness gave other details of a technical character ; but their repetition would -not be of interest to the general reader .
FRIDAY . The first witness examined was Captain Dacres , R . N ., of the Sanspareil , who stated that he went to Balaklava on the 26 th of October . He entered into several details , the upshot of which was to show that the harbour was not in the filthy condition -which had been described by other witnesses , although he acknowled ged that it was always overcrowded . Captain Milne , of the Admiralty Board , who had the direction of the transport board , was next examined . His evidence sought to prove that all had been done which it was possible to do . He said , however , that he thought the consolidation of the two departments of Somerset-house and Whitehall ought to have taken
place long ago , for much inconvenience arose under the old system in consequence of Admiralty business being carried on at the two places separately . He was not prepared to admit that the transport department was the only one which had failed ; since evendemand made upon it by the Government had been strictly and promptly complied with . The -requisition made -upon him for the sending out of winter clothing and huts was so sudden that some time was lost , owing to the difficulty in obtaining transport vessels . With regard to the forms used in the Admiralty , he did not think there was any superabundance ; at all event ? , not too many to check the efficient discharge of the duties of the service .
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The fire from our batteries , at the latest advices , still continued , though we seem as far as ever from getting f > ossefision of iSebastopol , or being forced to retreat . The Russians , with a deadly determination to dispute every inch , repair almost directly the iajuries-wihich our gauss produce ; the Allies , with an equally deadly determination to advance , keep gettingnearer-and jae « rer-4 o the walls ,... and are . HOE bringing their tremendous weight of metal to bear upon the fortifications . And so these Titanic foes stand glaring at each other in mortal combat , each , apparentry , too strong to yield ,-and not strong enough to triumph . The cannonade opened before daybreak . A wretched morning ushered in the . work ; for a heavy
mist hung over the earth , and souds of drifting rain , carried by a strong wind , drenched the poor shivering gunnetre as they served the artillery . Fortunately for us ,: however , the wind carried the rain and smoke over towards the iinssians , who were half blinded by the incessant beating in their faces . Botli aides lnigln : bavfi quoted Ben Jonson's line : — " It rises like a morning full of fate . " " Our fire , " says the Daily News Correspondent , " was of Kussinn
directed principally against the advanced line defences around -the arsenal and Knrnbelnaia suiburo ; commencing from the two new redoubts on the right of Careening Bay , and following the lino of the works to the south , or Admiralty Harbour . This coinprchonfls tho Lunette battery immediately above Careening Jiaj " , on the left or ivest side ; n new redoubt thrown up lately on the cliff above tho roadstead , and still fiirtnet to the left than the last-named work ; the Bfamelon redoubt ; and tho Malakhoff , Kcdan , and Bnrrnck
battenos . " , Tho opening of the batteries was kep t so close i secret that the Russians were taken completely dj BQTtrrisc , and for a moment wore almost paraiyseu . They soon , however , got the Flagstaff battery into play ; butrthe Hound Tower and tho Mamclon Mon some time before they cotfld answer to our vollcjs , and , for half an howr after they commenced , t » cj ¦ were but feeble in ( their demonstrations , ikvon ow own men wore astonished ; for nothing was Known of the intention the night before . ' i This grand operation was prefaced by ^«" proceedings of a Htrategical character on both siat The ( Russians Imd connected their rifle-pits inro * deep trench , which they joined on to Jwrrjad vnncw trench close to the l * rench -mwIcb . 'They had aW
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390 Tgffl XEA . DIE& . QSajukda ^
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THE WA& .
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Leader (1850-1860), April 28, 1855, page 390, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2088/page/6/
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