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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE . It is difficult to see into the motives of men but the results of their actions can be seen . " Whatever may have dictated the bullying course taken on our part towards the United States—whether it was an aristocratic contempt for the citizens of a community which has no titled grandees , or some positive misinformation carried to head quarters—the result is , that our statesmen have prepared humiliation for themselves and their country .
They have placed themselves in the position of endeavouring to extort what they cannot compel , and of losing what they might have had for the asking ; and they have prepared for General Pierce , a triumph over them , from which they mighfe easily have shut him out . Our readers will remember that when the first demonstrations against the United States were made in this country , -we explained the character of the two chief questions that then
existed . There were , Ave said , other points in dispute , but these were the chief . They were the infraction of the Neutrality Act by the open recruitment of soldiers for the British Legion in the United States , and the violation of the Bulwer-Clayton treaty in Central America . The President's message will be found in exact accordance with the explanations ' we then gave ; only , if we may be permitted to , say so , our own explanation was much clearer than that which Franklin Pierce
appears to be able to give to Congress . The recruitment was really an unimportant affair , and it was made important only by ihe malignant intrigues of the subordinates whom Mr . Crampton and Mr . Howe too greatly trusted . Stinted in means , Mr . Howe was not able to be so open-handed as the representatives of an aristocratic country like this should have , been ; he permitted himself to purchase the service of three or four cosmopolitan adventurers , who really became agents
and informers against him . Whether or not , he had not money enough fairly to purchase their service ; or whether , while they pocketed his money , they worked for the enemy , we know-not ; but certain it is , that they , his servants , rendered his case as open as it could be in the defiance of the Neutrality Act , and then informed against him . A little frank explanation , a little explicit disavowal of acts which our Government really did not intend , would have sufficed to sever the Government in
Downing-street from the blunders of its agents in the United States ; but , instead of repudiating acts that were really not sanctioned from London , the charges of the- Americans were met by a surprising justification ; and thus our Government' virtually adopted the flagrant misconduct of Strobel , the mistakes of Mr . Howe , and the -want of tact which Jed Mr . CIiampton into mixing himself up in such very questionable proceedings . It was made a question between England and America only by this chain of blunders on the English
side . If there had been sufficient tact at any one point in the series of official ? ,, those beneath would have been left to the ihto tlmt they hud brought upon thcniKclvo . s , the neutrality of the United Slntois would have been vindicated , but England would lmvu had no complicity in the matter . Am it ; i . s , General Pieucis has been provided with the opportunity of crowing over the defeated English agents ; and our officials , wo , say , have prepared that triumph for General Pikuck , and are volunteers in being chained to his car .
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the settlement be worth ? Of what duration will the good understanding be ? Interpreting the Russian reply , however , in its probable sense—the acceptance of the proposals " as a basis "—it may be an imposture , and , if entertained at all , must have an ambiguous effect . Morally , it means nothing less than that Russia is now forced into an attitude of submission ; diplomatically , it leaves
it will be time to reckon with that governing class whose incapacity has allowed the nation al reputation to suffer during a two years' which has cost England one hundred and fifty millions of money and thirty thousand men .
everything unsettled . There is this difference between an unconditional and a vague acceptance . An unconditional acceptance admits of no discussion as to principles , but simply as to the methods of putting them into execution ; An acceptance of the terms as a " basis " means , broadly , that Russia is willing to negotiate , and to approach , directly or indirectly , the plan laid down by Austria and the Allies .
The ambiguous result we allude to is , then , that the re-opening of negotiations , within this indefinite area , must have the effect of relaxing the naval and . military . preparations of the Allies . With a probability of peace before them , is it reasonable to believe that they will continue expending their treasures , fitting out their armaments , preparing the means of invasion ? Men do not , in private life , litigate with unabated pertinacity when there is a prospect of a compromise . A formal armistice would not , in all likelihood , be declared , yet a virtual suspension of arms would no doubt follow the announcement of a new
ConrTHE RUSSIAN ACCEPTANCE . There is a clear distinction between the acceptance of the Austrian proposals by Russia , " unconditionally , " and her acceptance of them " as a basis of negotiation . " An unconditional acceptance would imply that Russia has submitted , explicitly and literally , to certain terms ; and that it only remains lor the Allies , conjointly with the mediating Power , to . give them effect . This , however , is the unofficial
version . The more guarded G-avernmental organs , with surer means of information , state that the Austrian scheme has been accepted only " a basis , " which would leave room for any extent of ¦ equivocation , and compromise , of discussion and modification . If this view "be correct , Europe has not advanced , diplomatically , beyond the point at which she stood before the Vienna Conferences . Russia accepted , the Four Points , -without reservation , " as a basis : " but . inth « dehatos whir-h on . « n ^ * ' as a basis ; " butin the debates which ensued
, , it was found that she treated as matters of detail , stipulations which the Western Powers maintained as matters of principle . So it may prove in the present negotiations . Supposing , however , the clear and unconditional acceptance by Russia of the Austrian propositions , many important arrangements have tobe carried out before the settlement will be complete . It would be undeniable , in such a case , that the original objects of the war have been fulfilled . Turkey will have been secured , and ,
in a certain sense , avenged . The violated frontier of th e Danube will have been placed tinder new guarantees . In the South , Russian influence will have receded — Sebastopol exists no longer , and powerful naval armaments are not to be permitted in the Euxine . The Protectorate monopoly will have been abolished . Finally , Russia will have acknowledged that she owes' compensation for an injury ^ perpetrated against her weak neighbour ; she will have yielded to the public law of Europe , and confessed herself unable to
sustain pretensions which she long refused even to abate . But , out of the original question , other questions have arisen . These are : the military occupation of the Crimea , the position of Austria in the Principalities , the protection of the Danubian Delta , the definition of the Asiatic frontier of Russia—never yet defined - —the fortifications of the Aland Isles , the relations between the Scandinavian and the Western Powers , and of Sardinia with the test of Italy and with Austria . If these points are not included in the settlement , what will
ference , even at Brussels . No truce ensued upon the discussion of the Four Points ; but at that moment a great military operation was in progress which no event , short of the actual signing of a treaty , could interrupt . We are now on the debateable ground between peace and war . No warlike movements are actually proceeding ; and , we repeat , the inevitable effect of a vague debate with Russia on the basis" of the Austrian proposals , must bo to paralyse those whom Napoleon called "the organisers of victory . " In such a diplomatic contest it is easy to foretell on which
side the superiority -will lie . Whether sincere or not in her intention of procuring peace , Russia will send to the Conferences her most practised diplomatists , who may obtain a success in their department , while the Imperial administrators gain time to fortify the Baltic , and to move new levies into Southern Russia and the Transcaucasian provinces . Therefore , no language held by Russia , unless it pledged her to accept , unconditionally , the terms admitted by the Allies , should induce any relaxation of the preparations for war . No such relaxation is discernible on her
part . Her proclamations in Asia Minor , and the concentration of her forces on the Courland frontier point to an opposite probability . If a debate is to be opened , there are numerous points of difference which may be bars to peace . To suggest one : the idea of surrendering Kars as a set off against the surrender of Sebastopol by the Allies is not only preposterous , but it indicates a determination not to part with any of the Bessarabian territory .
For ourselves , we have no desire to * see an aimless war prolonged . We have consistently expressed the opinion that the present struggle will' be only political and diplomatic in its results , and that it has nothing to do with the liberties or with the civilisation of Europe . At the same time , however , there is an English point of view from which English journalists
must regard the war . Its diplomatic objects being just , they must be taken by force , if Russia will not concede them . If Russia is prepared to concede them , we think the English public is prepared for peace ; if not , at whatever sacrifice to individuals of interest or feeling , the struggle must be unflinchingly pursued . When tranquillity ia restored in Europe
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60 T H E L E A PER . [ No . 301 , Saturday ;
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SATURDAY , JANUARY 19 , 1856 .
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^ £ UL otlnng so revolutionary , because there is £ ? v ^ 4 . T ? ° unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to keep things . . fixed when all the world is by the very tow of its creation , m eternal progress .-Da . Abnom > .
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NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS . « o notice can be taken of anonymous communications . Whatever is intended for insertion must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer ; not necessarily for publication , bnt as a guarantee of his good faith . It is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we receive . Their insertion is often delayed , owing to a press of matter ; and when omitted , it ia frequently from reasons quite independent of the merits of the communication . Communications should always be legibly written , and on one side of the paper only . If long , it increases the difficulty of finding space for them . " We cannot undertake to return rejected communications .
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Jan. 19, 1856, page 60, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2124/page/12/
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