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NOTICES TO C ORRESPONDENTS . NT ) notice can be taken of anonymous communications . Whatever is intended , for insertion must be authenticated by the name and address of the -writer ; not necessarily for publication , but as a guarantee of his good faith . It is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we receive . Their insertion is often delayed , owing to a press of matter ; and when omitted , 3 t is frequently from Teasons quite independent of the merits of the communication . - Communications shouia always be legibly written , and on one side of the pnperonly . If long , it increases the difficulty of finding space for them . We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . During the Session of Parliament it is often impossible to find room for correspondence , even the briefest .
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SIR JOHN MONEILL'S REPORT . It is a popular opinion that , had not Russia interrupted , "by concessions , the progress of the war , the next campaign would have been an unbroken course of victory . Something like disappointment has piqued the public mind , because our gun-boats and our floating-batteries will probably be Laid up in ordinary , without testing the "impregnability" of Cronstadt .
It is said , and by many believed , that , on a given signal , our army in the Crimea wouldhave defeated the enemy , surpassed the French , and restored the prestige of 1815 . Nay , as a man . discharges his gun before he hangs it up , there are politicians who , consenting to a treaty with Russia , would seele another war across the Atlantic , or anywhere , so that our preparations might not have been
vam . Can we be sure , however , that , were 185 6 to be a year of warfare , no signal blunders would neutralise our preparations , no signal disasters interfere with our successes ? "We have a larger army , and a more manage > - able navy ; but have we repented xis of : our Ways , driven " the system " into the Desert of Sin , and invented a new organisation ? Great forces mismanaged only aggravate confusion ' , and the reproach it brings . It is a
wholesomereflection to keep m mind , that we might have despatched our Baltic fleet , for the third time , without all the essentials of warfare . A reaf sea campaign would have severely tried the capacities of the Admiralty Board . What guarantees liave we that , in the Eas # , our eighty thousand men would have attacked the North side of Sebastopol without a > ' re * - petition of the Redan disaster ; or , that march ing upon the interior , their means of transport and supply would not have failed ?
Our administrators have broken down so deplorably , that their own Commissioners expose error after error , not of routine only , but of personal conduct . Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tuixoch , reviewing the successive misfortunes of the first Crimean winter , attribute none to unavoidable circumstances . The information they collected was the counterpart of that which was collected at " Westminster , by the Parliamentary Committee . It would be superfluous to retrace the story }—the
sufferings of the army , the unhealthy and scanty diet , the dull bigotry of Peninsular precedent , negligence in London , and negligence at headquarters , the supercilious apathy of individuals , and the unintelligible stupidity of departments , the rtiin that followed , and the magnificent self-devotion displayed by officers and men . Bat two or three of Sir John McNeili / s illustrations are equal to the worst which , i « England , were attributed to the
versatile malice of " Our own Correspondent . While the scurvy was at its height , nearly twenty thousand pounds weight of lime-juice lay for two months in the Commissariat stores at Balaldava . The Commander-in-Chief had never heard of its arrival . But no one was responsible . " The glorious company of officials stood excused , because there were no " regulations" directing the issue of lime-juice to soldiers " on land . " Therefore , the "
Inpcctor-Genoral's" Toports were written ir vain . The Adjutant-General , in NovenibQ and December , was warned that the troop !
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necessities , to exhaust still farther her rmpoverislied Lombard dominions ; her bank schemes and her railway schemes have failed ; Prussia has detached from her interest several of the lesser German States . Prussia , besides increasing her weight in the Frankfort Diet , has profited by an extensive neutral trade . She has availed herself of an elastic revenue to arm the Rhine frontier . Excluded
from the Congress of Paris , she knows that , if a peace be signed , her signature will be invited to render it the common act of Europe , when it will be her option to assent or to protest—though it is not probable that the Prus - sian King would repudiate a treaty accepted by the Russian Emperor . The influence of Prussia , it is true , has operated ambiguously to the Allies ; "but she laad no goodwill to forfeit in France , and England is well aware that half-a-million . bayonets in Prussia form a valuable counterpoise to any other half-million within other frontiers .
governments , and remember that , when the war h . as ended , we have no further reason to abate the influence of Prussia . For , after great collisions , the tremor of the political system does not immediately cease . We shall do well , not only to keep our armaments in the highest efficiency , but to regard , with the most farsighted and solicitous discretion , both present and possible alliances .
Some of the organs of opinion in Central Germany deny that Prussia is the representative power of Germany . It is true that she is controlled by wary and vigilant rivals . But the King of Prussia occupies in the Frankfort Assembly a position , something like that of a government in the face of a formidable opposition . This opposition , however , is not ent irely embodied by the Austrian Emperor . The quasi-liberal Constitutions of some of the minor
THE GERMAN CONFEDERATIOH" AND THE WAR . The idea that Prussia has forfeited her European position is a fallacy . Her influence has not lain dormant , nor is it ignored by the other Powers . It has been exerted in accordance ¦ w ith the historical policy of that kingdom , and it is not easy to decide whether Austria or Prussia has played the winning game . There lias been an essential difference in the action
of those governments ; biit their object is one . It is the aim of Austria to increase her weight in the general councils of Europe , because this decides her position in Germany . It is the aim of Prussia to secure preponderance in Germany , because this decides her position in Europe . - ^ ^ 'V ^ wi Prussia is , de facto , the representative German Power . Nearly all her territories are
purely German ; she has many more German subjects than Austria . Austria , with the majority of her population non-Germanic , lies , in great part , outside of Fatherland , beyond the national frontier . Thus , ib would , be unwise and unnatural in her Emperors to depend , for their influence in Europe , on their German " following" alone . Prussia , on the other hand , which governs more Germans than are contained in the whole of the minor States of
the Confederation , knows , that to be paramount in Germany is to be important in Europe . Following these distinct courses , with one object in view , Austria and Prussia have not deviated from them during the present war . As a consequence of her isolated position , Prussia finds herself , at the approach of the Paris Congress , excluded from the consultations of the belligerent and mediating Powers . Austria , as the result of her participation in
affairs external to Germany , gains a leading place at the deliberations ; but while her diplomacy is engaged abroad , that of Prussia is active at home , and , we repeat , we are not sure which of the rival powers has approached most nearly the object of this diplomatics competition . Austria is conspicuous in the negotiations ; she has gained
the confidence of France , and the formal amit y of England ; she has extended her influence on the Danubo , and checked a "war which gave Piedmont an iufiuenco in Italy , dangerous to an alien power . But she hats kept a . vast army , daring n year an « l a half , on a wai * footing ; she has mortgaged a large portion of her revenues ; her financial weakness is notorious 1 ; ahe has been compelled , by military
states are obnoxious to both the leading powers ; and , feeble as these states are , in a military sense , they are amenable to the public law of Europe , and can only be attacked insidiously and undermined by slow degrees . Austria , and Prussia have a common interest in quenching the little liberty still possessed by the German race ; but they are themselves divided , and partly by virtue of their dissensions the remnants of Constitutionalism STirvive .
A peace , concluded at Paris , might modify the relations of the German powers to each other , and to the rest of Europe . The public has been accustomed to believe that Prussia is a . neutral nonentity , but her influence has at least been forcible in the sense of peace . Great Britain , in fact , were she disposed . to pursue the Russian war , would find herself opposed to an undeclared coalition in Europe . The Continent , represented by its dynasties , is agreed on the necessity of a pacification , partly because it
fears that the real invasion of the North might light up a dangerous enthusiasm ; partly because , a continued ~\ var would chiefly serve the practical interests , and might chiefly promote the naval and military prestige , of England . What does M . de Larocttejaqtjelin say , in the pamphlet lie addresses to the statesmen of Europe generally ? That the Russian navy ought not to be destroyed , because it may be useful to France ; that the conquests of Russia in Asia ouoht to be encouraged rather
than opposed . Simultaneously , the Austrian press utters identical sentiments , and there are not wanting politicians to interpret these signs as ominous to England . But , when , the Russian conflict ceases , virulent as the German press may be , and fiercely as the hybrids of Belgium may bark at the great power to which they owe their half-developed vitality , tliere we continental interests which preclude tlie military union of all the Powers , which
divide Austria from France—except where they meet in Italy—and which woxild render it unwise , on the part of England , to court the good-will of Austria to the too great disparagement of Prussia . Unhappily , the nations of Europe are not sol ( -governed ; they arc the sp > ort of their rulers ; too often they identify themselves witih dynastic vanities . While this ( jjnjtiom lasts , and supersedes natural human interests , we must consider the probable relations of
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February 9 , 1856 . ] 1 * H E L E APER , . fa fJL
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SATURDAY , FEBRUARY 9 , 1856 .
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There is nothing so revolutionary , because there is nothing so unnatural and convulsive , as the strain , to keep things fixed when all the world is by the very law of its creation in eternal progress . —Da . Abnold .
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Feb. 9, 1856, page 131, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2127/page/11/
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