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    and * Spain , allowed thafr the character oi the shi p should determine the cargo ; Btet * d&rrag Her next naval war f&und ^ . nec essary "to resume , m all their rigour , t 5 be maxima oC her . ancient code , and by tite ; arerfMDr ^ 'ering' operation of her decrees provoked' that : Armed Neutrality whiety headed ^ By CTa / ehebiite TL . included nearly all tba continental states of Europe . Still , kt spite of this stupendous coalition , the advantages conferred on Great Britain by the extent of her fleets , and the destructive

    effect ' , of her right of search and her blockades , enabled her to triumph , and to emerge-from the-war confirmed in her maritime supremacy . That example was followed during the wars of the Revolution . The tpade . of the neutral states was interrupted almost as completely as that of the belligerents . Scarcely a vessel could show itself at sea , in nny parb of the world , without breaking the limits of some fictitious blockade , without being searched , and condemned to seizure . The general peace left the

    maritime code of Europe untouched , with all its uncertainties and barbarities ; though the United States have unremittingly endeavoured to procure , in this respect , a revision of the public-law of nations . Upon the commencement of the war with Uussia , orders in council were issued in England , announcing certain relaxations of her practice in respect of the neutral flag ; but it was distinctly and emphatically declared that the relaxation was exceptional , and was not to be construed into a change of policy or an abandonment of doctrine .

    The Paris declaration surprised the American Government . That Government , of course , could not but acquiesce in a declaration which established its peculiar principles as the international law of the Old "World , But its assent is limited to the second , third , and fourth points . The right of privateering will not be surrendered by the United States while their navy remains upon its present inferior scale . It has not been the policy of their Government to keep up , during peace , all the machinery of war ; they could not

    encounter , with their public armed ships , the enormous fleets that would certainly be fitted out by Great Britain . At the same time , the United States arc not exempt from naval attacks , and , therefore , to compensate for their deficiency in the organized means of defence , they rely upon the conversion of the largo merchant service into a fleet of cruisers , to let be looso all over the world , to protect American commerce , and give employment to

    the huge navies of Europe . The abolition of privateering , according to the American argument , would strengthen an enemy ' s means of attacking the United States , and diminish their resources of defence . Tho English argument is , . tliat to surrender the right of privateering and the right of search without any reciprocal concessions on the part of America , is . to impair the foundation of our maritime power . In tho event of war , a thousand cruisers would bo armed in the American ports , and

    terrify tho English trader m every sea . Neither our Indian nor our colonial trade would be safe : a large proportion of our navalTorcoB must bo engaged as convoys , another largo proportion must bo occupied in maintaining those blockades which , during the last great maritimo struggle , wo established'by aponful of ink and n sheet of paper . The term Filibuster was firnt applied to British captains by French writers , when , in 1801 , tho right ot' search was enforced in every sea , and when tho enemy ' s trado was destroyed , under whatever Hag it watt carried on . It is certain that tho exercise . * of- tlua right was calculated to increase prodigiously tho power of England

    durmg-. » naval' war . Tkerolifa 1 ft < m'i $ ia&iVi& > barbarous to maKewarupoirigrivateintiearestfr ir one- of * the- fallacies- inseparable , fitmrpolitical' sentimentaJity .- A-IPwars ,. aS ^ Moek * - a ' des , are directed against private' interests-j j nor- are private interests' attaeKeeP more ' grievously when neutral ships are forbidden ' to carry enemy ' s goods , than when the enemy ' s : goods are seized in his own vessels . Itris byj injuiing the personal and private interests ojq individuals that nations are exhausted ^ and restrained from the continuance of war .

    The abandonment of the right of search , and the declaration that free ships make free goods , may increase the courtesies of modern warfare , but - they amount to a serious depar * trure from the historical policy of England- — the policy that made her naval power supreme . " What was the reason of this sacrifice ? " Where was its necessity ? It was natural that France , Russia , and Prussia should denounce the principles of a maritime code

    which have always operated to their detriment ; but why the British Government , without consulting the Legislature , or securing the reciprocity of the United States , should yield a right which enabled England to defeat the Armed Neutrality , i » inconceivable . It would almost appear as if'the powers interested in forcing us into an . American war had cajoled Lord Pax / me B 80 : 01 * into this-unfortunate capitulation .

    At all events , when the probabilities of a naval war are discussed , it should be remembered that our means of offence have been diminished by this act of Lord Paiz&erstoij ' s Cabinet , and that while we repudiate the co-operation of privateers , our enemy would send them flying before every wind , harassing and threatening our commerce wherever a . ship can float .

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    . A CAUTION TO ITALY . Lord PAi / SrEitsTON has thought it necessary , in the most public place and in the most emphatic manner , to caution the Sardinian Government . England , he says , would regard any aggressive act on tho part of Sardinia as unfriendly to herself . This is a new development of mystification . It is a menace to the Liberal party in Italy , it implies a want of confidence ' in Sardinia , it furnishes Austria with a quotation to prove to the Italians that they have not the sympathy , and will not have the support , of England . Austria is the aggressor in Italy . It' -is not Sardinia that threatens Austria ; it is

    Austria that threatens Sardinia . Her military camps , formed with unprecedented celerity , have been planted close to the Sardinian frontier . Her system of occupation resembles a beleaguering lino drawn round tho Piedmontese territory . The peace ot Italy is disturbed by her violence ; she thrusts her protectorate upon tho Duchies ; her armies are everywhere present , her propagnnd is everywhere active , yet Lord Pa : l-

    mjohston insinuates a suspicion that tho policy of Piedmont is aggressive . At tho same time , tho Austrian journals and the Neapolitan crown lawyers are endeavouring to per-Biifulo tho Italians under their domination that Piedmont is in a state of disastrous anarchy . Itcaily , the police of the Continent nro enabled to damage tho Liberal cause HulHciently by falsehood and defamation without tho ai ' d of tho British Premier .

    Tho friends of order may bo well assured that , into whatever course of policy Count Catouu may bo forced , there are men in Italy who will not resign themselves to Austrian despotism . Italy will turn against her oppressors . Tho Tory printn in England discerning this consummation in tho diHtnnco , regret that they have avowed

    . . tHtfr sy-mpatfcy witfr tfe ** causer oF ItsHinr xrrfepen'dence ^—a sympathy' arisuijjj * etrtireffr * krafrof adewetbi « sere * trtfier'lvltige ; USfe * iTCipte A 31 rance fiar ^ wf ^ s ^ ied ' the fattf of tfte ' people - of ^ Italy . Irattce * ' UttSP AhistWa * fidP doubt , would combine- to ' &We &&&& $ ? , and ? England' might * play her falfee- and little parti . ; hnis empires are not most 1 powerful * wiiem jtfiey make the greatest display of' them

    power , nor is the rule of Austria * in Italy rendered more secure by the fact that sheoiff ' compelled to make military demonstration ® at every point to repress tba rising' spirit afi the nation . " We are not to forget that which closet politicians , who write without , knowledge of the movements in progress , affeots . to set aside , that twenty-five millions o £ a brave and cultured people are impatient for the release of their beautiful land from

    foreign occupation . They may be taunted with the fate of Sicily , and threatened with the fate of Brescia ; but they know the price of liberty , and they know , also , that the despotism of Austria is not the only despotism in Europe that is reared on hollow foundations . There is reason to believe that intimate relations have recently been established between the Piedmontese and Prussian

    Goivernments ; that a strong party in the Duchies of Parma and Tuscany is prepared to resist the progress of Austrian encroachment ; that the great Powers are not agreed on the Italian question ; that the Papal Ca ^ binet is at variance withithat of Vienna on important points . That : the great Powers are not in harmony is proved by the language of the Prussian journals , and by that of the Central German organ , which affirm , with not less earnestness than Count CAVOira ,

    that the Austrian occupation of Italy is a source of evil ; that Austria will not be permitted to drag the German Confederation into a course of action unfavourable to the Italian people ; and that , if she undertakes the enterprize , she will undertake it ; alone . This is an important aspect of the crisis- —for a crisis there is , though it may develop itself slowly . _ _ .. „ T the

    " Iu 1848 , " remarks Gorrespondance Italienne , " Piedmont had to encounter the hostility of the whole German body . In 1856 it * accredits a special envoy to the Diet of Frankfort , and receives from Prussia only cordial assurances of friendship and good-r will . " Thus the policy of Austria encounters obstacles which are entirely omitted from tho calculations of certain English writers . _ .

    The Italian nation can only regard these movements in the light of useful checks upon the violence of Austrian policy . Their own destinies must be worked out by their own hands . When tho Op inione bids them confide iu diplomacy , thoy listen to the reply at tho JDiritto and the Unione , and refuse to put their trust in foreign statesmen any more than in foreign soldiers .

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    SADLEIR ' S ATtT OV HOOK-KEEPING ; In December last the Tipperary Bank , tho lever by which John Sadmoiii dragged up resources when he specially required them , was in imminent danger of that final Binash which happened in the spring . It was vory necessary to raiwo a hundred thousand pounds ; John SAin / urn thought that that sum could bo obtained by persuading certain English

    shareholders to part with their money and lodge it in Tipperary Bank -shares ; ior that purpose it was necessary to make the bank , then in a stato of hopeless insolvency , appear to be a flourishing concern . Tlio Hums m its coflbM must appear to luivo increased its business-connexion m . mt lmvo increased tho customers' accounts and balances must haw

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• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), June 28, 1856, page 611, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2147/page/11/