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feinted but connected ; Aat the former object exercises some confcitouling in-Hiienee ov % r the latffer * ; Ihough we cannot by our senses pcgpeejve in what mawber this inflaeisee is e&erted . Wlio is there that does not feel with D .
Stewart , that * ' the natural bias of the mind is surely ; to conceive physical events as somehow linked together ; and natural substances * as possessed of certain powers and virtues ,, which lit them to produce particular effects" ? —But I for one must beg- leave to dissent from this celebrated writer , when he adds , " that S ^ e hare no re ason to
believe this to be the c&se , has been shewn in a very particular manner by Mr . Hume , and by other writers ; anS must , indeed , appear evident to every person , on a moment ' s reflection : "
for neither Hume nor any other writer has ever yet shewn that physical events are not linked together ; nor has any One of them proved that the " powers and virtues" which have been
bestowed upon "material substances" are not such as to * ' fit them to produce particular effects / ' The whole that fcas been done by these writers amounts to no more than , first , to shew that
we can have no knowledge o £ the properties'of material substances , except through the medium of our senses : and , secondly , that our senses never give us any information respecting the connexion between uhvsioale . vpnts . the connexion between physical events .
—But , on the other hand , it must be observed , that in no case "Whatever do they afford us any evidence that there is really no eonn ? e * xion , no vinculum whatever . The fact is , they give us
no information at all on the subject , either for or against . From which it appears that the vinculum or bond > if there be any , 4 s something which can no more be perfceived by our senses than the miaterial -substance or
substratum itself : it , therefore , follows , that we can only come to the knowledge of its existence or non-e # istenee , by examining whether the effefetg or phenomena observed are such as must proceed from its existence or non-ex * - iatefteti ^
Now , if-we take any two physical evetits , which to crtir senses appear to be eonjoitted , we afle absolutelycfertain that they"toast either be cdnnvct&d or they mufcafc iiof , for * there is no other stt f fposkioa besides these two possible . Firfet ,. thenytet **« sappost tbeta to be
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really connected : it matters npt whether this coniiexion ^ od ^ dfe froto the natyre bestowed lipon * thBii at the creation , whichis ~ thiqfpht ? dn / of some , Or whether it proceeds frt > ni those laws of action which the Supreme Being has imposed upon himself , so
long as he shall Continue the present system , which appeals to be me opinion of others . For in either case , we are certain that the two Qbjects or events , which we have supposed to be really connected , must always remain connected , so long as they retain the same naturie , or the same laws are
observed ; that is , so long as man shall exist as he now is : and , consequently , if we perceive one of these objects or events , at any time or place , we are quite certain , if this supposition be correct , that the other must
be along with it . Let us how examine the other supposition , viz . that they are not connected . —Now , whenever there is a very great numbet of really unconnected objects of events , it admits of mathematical demonstration .
that the chances against the juncti 6 n of any two particular objects or events far exceeds the chances for it vvhen there is only one trial : that the chances for the same two , being twice conjoined successively , is still far less : and , in short , th ^ t the " chances against
their being conjoined any cOd $ id Arable number of times successively , is so iricon ^ ivlfl > ly gr ' eat ^ s to tnake such a contiritied c 6 njttnit ! tion approach as near to an absolute impossibility as any thing cfen be' conceived to be , which is not r'gally so . It therefore follows , that if two objects be really
unconnected , we shall always ,- m 'a fe \ v trials , nnd them separate or uniionjoihed : whereas , if they be really connected , they » 0 ver can be £ &tiftd separate . ' ; > But we fcn 6 w , from observation , that there ate in Any physical events which a ^ ri ^ ar al wjtty ^ ^ onjoinfed . For
exafttpte ; if cold , above a certain degr $ e , be applied to pure wkter , the wiater iis always frozeiii Jif ftrfe be applied tfr wb . x ; it M ^ wfchp tnelted . Hfetice , if \^ com pare * these facts with
the conclusions dedircfed from the two foregoing siipposiii ^ n ^*• ' * $ ! & joiily possible o * tes , ^ it ) necessarily foHp ^ s that We cannot avoid believing tic&X the application of ^ old to 'i&fa ^ tiaft . of fire to wok , is soiiieho ^ 6 v " m ^ nk rmUy
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218 J 5 s * ay on Trutth
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), April 2, 1823, page 218, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1783/page/26/
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