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defected , must believe in the facts which have led to the detection . We must t ^ tn fore believe in the existence of a fchith / though we may in m ^ ny . cases tye ^ ignorant where it is to be found . "—P . 1 £ .
In the same manner it is argued respecting knowledge , regained through the medium oPmemory :
" Here we may also urge , that there can be no method of detecting a delusion in some cases , but by being convinced of realities in others . We could not form an idea of a deception , if we were always deceived . It is a deviation from the usual tenor , which convinces us of a possibility in some cases , and an impossibility in all . "—P . 31 .
On self-evidence our author asks t € Strictly speaking , can any thing be said to be self-evident , exclusive of sensi-? ble objects ? A man can advance no ar ' guih&its to prove that he sees , hears , smells , and feels , stronger than the report of his
senses ; hut whatever is not an immediate object of sense , requires a certain degree of thought . It requires a process , to which self-evidence cannot be applied , in its literal sense , though it is by courtesy as expressive of extremely quick perception . Should the truth of this observation be doubted , we may still assert , without the fear of confutation , that numerous axioms which are currently received as first principles , and as it were prior to all reasoning , have originally gone through a process which has escaped the memory . "—Pp . 53 ,
54 . It woiikl be gratifying to ourselves had we space" to present our readers with an analysis of this disquisition on Rational Conviction , With which the
volume operis , and of that with which It concludes , 'On Moral Obligation , as ( hey form together a masterl y view of tfie nature of man in his double capacity of a creature formed both for contemplation and action . Trie second Speculation is , On
Disinterested Benevolence , and we agfee With the aothdr that ** what seems to cf ^ ciere " this question is the fact , that , in ' nb ' one instance , is the pleasure derived from the excitement of a passion a mifOtive for the indulgence of that pass ; 9 n ^ or the pqin wti ic h it occasions , ijx £ sty le , motive to liberate ourselves from " it /*
« : \\ c &m , ^ Uere be more , pr / onr * r ] ty io the assertion , that when yfe , feej , distress at the distress of another , we relieve him merely to & £ ria <* oWr crtvii « lHFe * irigs , -itiatrYn the So&ttt > rf , th £ it \ vTi ** i i * & fear mid ft ? from £ ^ 1 * , lcx » iic ! . » " ' ? r * ' . •¦ tt ' ¦ ' - ¦ ¦ ¦ -- ¦
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danger it is not to escape the danger , but to J ^ e . released from the fear . ? or when we r «\ joic « it is not on account of the good in contemplation , but because of the pleasant effects of tbe joy itself ?"—P . 95 . 4 C The object of the passion suggests the motive for action , and not the desire to
indulge , or to be exempt from , the sensation peculiar to the passion . If this be the case in every instance which concerns ourselves , a parity of reasoning requires us to expect the same law of human agency respecting :
others ; particularly as tbis mode of reasoning so perfectly coincides with the consciousness of every benevolent mind , which the other system so straugely opposes . ' * - " — P . 91 .
The third Enquiry respects the Existence of a Moral Sense , to which it is objected that " if a moral sense existed , of the nature , and for the purposes supposed by its advocates , a dispute concerning its existence could not have arisen . * 1 he mental sense would have been as obvious as any of the corporeal senses . The mau whose olfactory
nerves are m such a healthy state that he can distinguish odours , never carls their existence into question . Every one kn&ws that he has optics to see and distinguish objects , and art ear to distinguish sounds . The Reluctance with which the doctrine of a sixth sense is received by one party , and the incapacity of the other to demonstrate its
existence , fully prove that the cases are not perfectly parallel , and lead us to suspect that there may be an essential discrepancy . ** On this objection it seems just to remark , that the advocated of the moral sense never could intend to use the word in precisely the same meaning , as when it is applied to the ' faculty of perceiving external objects
through the corporeal organs . They applied it analogically to the mental power of distinguishing between moral good and evil , and analogies do not require that the cases be perfectly parallel . We extract the following passage , because it presents briefly and at once the Doctor ' s theory of moral sentiments .
" We have attempted to prove that tlie grant ! characteristic of virtue consists in its being an energy of mind , designedly exerted by a voluntary agent , productive of personal or social advantages , according to certain invariable principles ; annj that vice , notwithstanding its personal ^ raUftcatipris £ hd temporary ad vantages i is iii its tnvri nature inimical to permatien't * "" i .
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Review . — Cogun * Ethical Questions . 3 & 7
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), April 2, 1817, page 227, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2463/page/35/
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