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these tenets do not conform to them ; and that necessarians and fatalists act in the common affairs of life precisely like libertarians , and consequently in opposition to the theory they have undertaken to defend . Hence Dr . C .
infers , that * ' upon the hypothesis of fatalism * every step we advance in knowledge we recede from utility , and in the same proportion as we become wiser , we become less fit and less disposed to fulfil the purposes of our being . " . . ¦
In the first place , this writer confounds the doctrine of Necessity ' , as it is explained by its ablest modern advocates , with that of Fatalism , which so commonly prevailed among the ancients , and is still professed by the followers of Mahomet . As far ,
however , as his reasoning is applied to the former , I have no hesitation in calling it mistaken and nugatory . From the confidence reposed by the learned preacher in the objections he has urged , we might almost infer that thev had never been answered . Why ,
I would ask , are we to suppose that the foreknowledge of the Deity must interfere with the activity of man ? For , admitting the events of futurity to he pre-ordained by infinite wisdom , yet to us they are contingent;—not contingent in an absolute sense , because we contend that what is foreseen
is inevitably fixed ; but they are so concealed from our confined views , and limited faculties , that we are unable to decide which among the possible incidents of human life will actually take place . That one of two
opposite events will happen is certain ; but as a human agent is entirely ignorant which of them is predetermined , that circumstance ought not to affect the formation of his plans and since he must have observed that
lie who employs the . means is more likely to secure the end than he who neglects them , it would evidently be the height of folly to remain inactive . The Mahometan , when he rushes to
hattlo , believes , and in my apprehension rightly believes , that his fate is fixed beforehand - y but us he cannot absolutel y know what that fate will he , ami as experience might have taught him , that the man who avoids
unnecessar y danger has a better prospect of escaping than be \\\\ q is indifferent about the matter , lie ought
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to perceive the absurdity of not using every mode of self-defence consistent with duty and honour . In the case of shipwreck , though it is pre-ordained beyond all doubt which part of the crew will be saved , and which will not .
does the persuasion of this truth justify inertness , or does it render the exertions of every individual for selfpreservation in the slightest degree less requisite ? The creed of the necessarians , when properly understood , inculcates no such practice . On the
contrary , it condemns inactivity and despondency , not merely in situations of peril , but in any circumstances , as alike hostile to our present and our future welfare , and as inconsistent with the fundamental principles on which the doctrine is founded . No
change in the physical world can take place without an adequate cause ; and no wish or design formed in the human mind can be accomplished without the adoption of active means . With respect to the other leading objection against Necessity , that it must be destructive of all
accountability and moral principle , Dr . Copleston , like most other writers on the same skle of the question , betrays great confusion of ideas . He confounds physical with moral necessity ; and frequently so intermingles acknowledged truths with mere assumptions
as to impose upon the reader who is unaccustomed to these speculations . He sets out with observing , that " Praise and blame , reward and punishment , uniformly imply that we think the party who is the object of them might have acted otherwise . " *
This assertion I must beg leave to deny ; and whatever maybe the popular opinion , the implication here stated is altogether unfounded . Reward and punishment , praise and blame , ought to be proportioned , and
will be so under the Divine govern - ment , to the voluntary observance or violation of duty , that is , to the tendency of the disposition from which the action arises to produce happiness or m ^ ejy . The powe r of the agent to have acted otherwise , so far from
being requisite to constitute moral worth , would , as interfering with the etticacy of motives , destroy its very essence . Dr . C . thus concludes the * Dis . I . p . 20 .
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University of Oxford , on Necessity and Predestination * 553
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vol xx . 4 u
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Sept. 2, 1825, page 553, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2540/page/37/
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