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CRITICAL NOTICES.
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Art . IV . —A Review of the Doctrine of Personal Identity ; in which are considered and compared the Opinions of Locke , Butler , Reid , Brown , and Stewart , upon that Subject . By an Old Ex-Scholar df Trinity College , Dublin . Longman . Pp . 86 .
A pamphlet avowedly and exclusively devoted to one of the most thorny and perplexed discussions in metaphysical science is a sort of phenomenon ; but we doubt whether , in an age so little addicted as the present to speculations of this kind , it is likely to meet with as much attention as in fact it deserves .
It displays considerable ability and acuteness , and the views of the question to which the writer has given his own sanction , may , perhaps , appear liable to as few objections as any of those which are the subjects of his criticism ; an
observation which may , however , be thought to convey but faint praise , when we consider the strange paradoxes which have been supported by some of the most profound philosophers . The author examines successively the opinions of the eminent writers whose names
appear in his title-page ; and in the course of the discussion we meet with much ingenious and acute criticism , accompanied now and then with a little eaptious trifling , which , however , in an argument depending so much on questions of words and names , it is perhaps extremely difficult to avoid . He arrives
at the conclusion , that the dispute , like many others In which doctrines have been maintained , apparently paradoxical and revolting , is in a great measure verbal , and that the real question is , what do we , or ought we to mean by the phrase Personal Identity ? Scarcely any two writers have given exactly the same definition of either of these terms , and therefore we cannot be much surpr ised that great apparent diversity should be observable in their
conclu-. Personal identity , according to Mr . Locke , is constituted by consciousness , or more properly , by memory , which is more commonly considered as the proof , or one of the proofs , by which a man
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may be convinced of his identity . From hence it follows , that if a man has forgotten any past incident of his life , he is no longer the same person , and , on the other hand , that if Pythagoras imagined himself to be Euphorbus , or a madman Alexander , they are really and truly identical . But if Mr . Locke ' s definition
is taken into the account , we find that all this strange paradox resolves itself into nothing more than a peculiar and arbitrary use of certain familial * terms . By personal identity he means , " a thinking , intelligent being , having reason and reflection , and that can consider itself &s itself , the same thinking thing , in different times and places . "
Our author understands . by Personal Identity " ' the continuation of the same organization of animal life in a human creature possessing an intelligent mind , that is , one endowed with the ordinary faculties of reason and memory , without
reference to the original formation of constitution of that mind , whether it be material or immaterial , or whether it survives or perishes with the body . ' " This definition of Personal Identity would leave the subject free from the following difficulties , which at present press upon
it;' * 1 . That which arises from the perpetual changes in the material identity of the body . " 2 . That which arises from the exclusion of the body of the man from his person , and which is so revolting to th £ common understanding of mankind .
" 3 . That which arises from the changes of state in the mind , either from the deteriorating operation of age , ( provided the ordinary faculties of rea- . son and memory fetaarn , ) or from the accidental changes of it from causes not permanent .
•* 4 . That which arises from the restriction of Personal Identity to consciousness only , and which is so fruitful of paradoxes . " 5 . That which arises from making Personal Identity commensurate with Menial Identity , which excludes altogether the consideration of whether the person be a living man or a departed spirit . " 6 . That which arises from making
Critical Notices.
CRITICAL NOTICES .
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), March 2, 1828, page 183, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2558/page/39/
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