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Untitled Article
equilibria between the two difficulties , and must have recourse to the same assumption for the solution of both . In some cases , the opposition of fact and testimony is yet greater . Assertions are made which imply a breach of the uniformity of causation . In such cases the assertions are to be immediately rejected , as no deviation from the uniformity of causation can be admitted . —Instance : A person declares that a cubic inch of ice exposed
by him to a temperature of 200 degrees of Fahrenheit retained its solidity at the expiration of an hour . The discrepancy of the facts is not to be overcome by any proof of the validity of the testimony . The testimony of a great number of philosophers to the same fact , under circumstances the most favourable to veracity , and secured from error or deception , is likewise to be rejected ; because the only argument in its favour is the uniformity of
causation , which is , at the same time , declared to be violated with respect to the physical event . If the testimony be admitted , the certainty of causation must be allowed to be greater in the mental than in the physical world ; which assumption is unfounded . Thus the important rule is established that no testimony can prove a breach of the uniformity of causation in physical events .
If it be objected that , in either case , a deviation from the law of causation is admitted , and why more readily in one than the other ? It is replied , that we have a more accurate knowledge of physical than of moral causes ; and the operation of many may be verified by experiments Should a man declare himself to have been an eye-witness of an incredible event , it is as easy to believe the law of causation violated in his person , as in the instance he asserts ; that his eyes and tongue have proved unfaithful , as that a cause has produced an inappropriate effect .
As testimony cannot prove the uniformity of causation , because it reaches only a limited number of events ; so neither can it prove the contrary . If we assume this principle antecedent to all testimony , and in the receptioa of testimony , we cannot subsequently discard it on the strength of the same species of evidence .
The previous observation , that human testimony is by far the most important kind of evidence , is qualified by the statement that the proofs of the feein g of a God belong to the class of physical evidences . The belief ia the uniformity of causation affords the ground-work of arguments of a Supreme Intelligence from appearances of wise and benevolent desi gn * Such is the substance of our author ' s argument .
His first position does not please us . The belief in the uniformity of causation affords the only ground of anticipation which we need , and on which we act ; but it is not the only one we can conceive , or which we acknowledge to have ever existed . Prophecy is independent of all reasoning , and of all assumption of the uniformity of causation . Our author , therefore , seems to disbelieve the possibility of prophecy by divine inspiration ; though , unless we were better acquainted with his views of Providence , we cannot decide how far the belief in ancient prophecy is
inconsistent with his philosophy . We have nothing farther to object till we come to the paragraph concerning assiertiqns which imply a breach of the uniformity of causation . \^ e have jSefo re , ^ id that we have no evidence to prove an essential connexion betw , een , causes and effects ; though within our experience , it has been invariable . In the present case we should compare the two apparent deviations from the , usual succession of events , and decide in favour of the least . In one of the instances presented t > y the writer , we should arrive at an opposite conclusion from that which he leaves us ta
Untitled Article
636 Essays on the Pursuit of Truth ,
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Sept. 2, 1829, page 636, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2576/page/36/
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