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    measurement , it is art , and knowledge . What particular art and knowledge it is , we shall hereafter inquire ; but that it is knowledge , we have clearly shown , in opposition to that opinion of the vulgar which we set out with combating . — Protagoras , and all others who were present , assented , and it was agreed that doing evil always arose from ignorance , and doing well from knowledge .

    Since , then , no one chooses evil , knowing it to be evil , but mistakingly supposing it to be good , no one , who is compelled to choose "between two evils , will knowingly choose the greatest . —Allowed . —But what is fear ? Is it not the expectation of some evil ?—It is . —Let Protagoras then defend himself , and show that he did not err , when he said that courage differed greatly from the other virtues . Did he not say , that the courageous were they who will encounter what others are afraid

    to face ?—Yes . —Who will encounter notj merely what the coward will encounter ?—Certainly not . —The coward will encounter only what is safe ; the courageous man what is formidable?—So men say . —They do : but do you say , that the courageous man will encounter what is formidable , knowing it to be formidable ?—Your previous argument has shown this to be untenable . —It has : for , if we have reasoned correctly ,

    no man encounters that which is formidable , knowing it to be so : for to be overpowered , and lose command of himself , we have shown to be a mere case of ignorance— . We have . —But all , whether brave or cowardly , are ready to encounter what they consider safe , —Very true : but the brave man and the coward differ even to contrariety in what they encounter . The brave man will encounter war , the coward will not . —

    War being a noble or an ignoble thing ?—A noble thing . —And , if noble , good ?—Certainly . —And , if noble and good , then , by our admission , pleasant?—Granted . —Are cowards , then , unwilling to do what they know to be the better and the more pleasant ?—To admit this would be to contradict our former admissions . —But the courageous man ; he too does what is better and more pleasant?—He does . —The courageous man , in short , is neither bold when he ought not , nor fearful when he ought not ; cowards are both . —Yes . —But if cowards < ire bold ,

    and are fearful , when they ought not , is it not from ignorance?—It is , —Then men are cowards from not knowing what is formidable ?—They are .- —But what makes men cowards , must be cowardice?—Agreed . —Then cowardice is the ignorance of what is and is not formidable ; courage , being the contrary of cowardice , consists merely in the knowledge of what is , and what is not , formidable . —Protagoras with mucli difficulty allowed that this consequence followed from what they had previously agreed upon .

    Socrates finally remarked what a whimsical turn their discussion had taken . Protagoras and he had changed parts in the course of it . He had begun by denying that virtue could be taught , and yet had engaged himself in a long argument to prove that all virtue consisted in knowledge , and therefore could be taught ; while Protagoras , who had

    begun by asserting that virtue is capable of being taught , had as strenuousl y laboured to show that it is not knowledge , and therefore not teachable . Seeing all this , said Socrates , I am entirely thrown into confusion , and would be most eager to engage in further discussion , and clear up the question of what virtue is , and whether it can be taught . Protagoras applauded his wish , and complimenting him on

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    210 Plato 9 Dialogues ; the Protagoras .

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), March 2, 1834, page 210, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2631/page/54/