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Untitled Article
an induction of all those which seem to arise from the invariable principles of the human frame and condition , a system of natural morality might , it was supposed , be constructed ; and from this sy stem , which would represent the general conscience of mankind , new inferences might be drawn , extending over domains of conduct hitherto unreclaimed . Such a moral code would resemble a body
of law organized by the consolidation of innumerable separate decisions ; and afterwards expanded by reasoning , so as to include many analogical cases , which experience had never brought to a tribunal . Let it be admitted , that this process was not the wisest ; still there is no more dogmatism in it than in the utilitarian system .
Both appeal to mankind at large , —the one to their moral sense , the other to their estimates of consequences ; and Mr . Bentham is just as liable to the charge of making an oracle of his personal calculations of pleasure and pain , as his opponents of legislating from their own emotions of approbation and dislike . The faults of the moral sense system are , in fact , much more those of modesty than of dogmatism . From a desire to proceed on a secure basis of experience , from a reverence for the universal feelings of mankind , in obedience to the maxim , ' ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus , ' its advocates too much forget that if the moral sentiments of men were to be improved , their existing
condition must not be made the measure of right and wrong ; that philosophy has a higher task than that of merely investigating what is felt , and must aspire to the discovery of some rule which may determine what ought to be felt . The moral sympathies of mankind , on the best supposition , onl y may be co-extensive with virtue ; the tendency to the agent ' s happiness must be , for it is that which makes virtue , —it touches the point of ultimate obligation .
The same criterion applies to the systems which represent virtue as consisting in the promotion of the general welfare . It does so ; but only because general coalesces with individual good . Were there a conflict between them , individual duty must take the side of individual happiness ; it would be impossible to establish an obligation in any other direction . Before , therefore , this
definition can be received , the coincidence of self-interest and benevolence must be demonstrated . The original property of virtue is clearly preferable , for a definition , to the derivative . In like manner , take the will of God as the measure of right .
The question recurs , what is the will of God ? Where is it to be found ? Revelation can , at best , suppl y it only to the limited portion of mankind , who admit the authority of the Scriptures . And of these many deny , and none can prove , that Christianity
contains an ethical code ; and the rest , while they inveigh against so heretical a doctrine , contribute to establish its truth b y their entire disagreement respecting the nature of this code . Are we then to seek for the will of God in nature ? By what conceivable
Untitled Article
Bentham * Deontology . 617
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Sept. 2, 1834, page 617, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2637/page/13/
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