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REVIEW. ** Still pleased to praise, yet not afraid to blame.'* — Pope.
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Art . I . —Ethical Questions ; or Speculations on the Principal Subjects of Controversy in Moral Philosophy . B T . Cogan , M . L > . Author of a Philosophicai Treatise on the Passions , &c . 8 vo . pp . 448 . Cadell and JDavies .
1817-r ^ HE mutual dealing of mankind is A so similar , that it might lead us to infer , that there is not much difference in their opinion of human nature ; yet it is certain there is no subject upon which men , plain as well as speculative , think more differently . While some see in it only what is corrupt and base and proper to be exterminated as soon as it is created , others find in it capacity
of every virtue and predominant dispositions , generally to goodness , and often to great moral excellence . It is a little remarkable , that the sceptical philosopher and the Calvinistic theologian , though at variance in most of their opinions , have laboured together in the degradation of our common nature - for while one declares that man has no
moral worth , the other maintains that his intellectual faculty is wholly inadequate to the discovery of truth . Thus virtue and knowledge are both beyond the reach of his nature ; and from the hands of these spoilers man comes , not surely as he comes from tjie hand of his Maker , without a trace ekher of
the intellectual or moral image 6 f the Creator . The author of the present volume is well known to most of our readers as an advocate of human nature ; and having formerly dafended it ably against the charge of innate and hereditary
depravity , he has in the work under review' entered his plea against the degradation of our intellectual nature , by asserting its sufficiency to explore truth . Inpoth he appears the zealous , enlightened , and , we think , victorious advocate , in a cause which is not bad ,
though it has been accidentally and industriously perplexed . We learn from the Doctors preface that the present volume , with the exception of the Strictures on I > r . Beatjie ' s Essay on Truth * is an off-shoot from the . . / Vnalysis of th& Passions . The first Enqujjy , ) n the Sources of Rational Conviction ,
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is a natural-and vseCuJ irrtrodjactiofi < & the ensuing speculations . It ^ niust ; be read . with pleasure by every man who respects human nature and value * truth , and with profit by those especially who are entering on the study of moral and mental philosophy . The arrangement is clear * the expression
luminous , the reasoning sound , and it is altogether a powerful antidote to universal scepticism ; and on this account it deserves the attention of those who , finding that they have much to unlearn , are half inclined to excuse themselves from the labour of enquiry , by rashly concluding that nothing can be known by man .
' * There must be , ' says our author , " such a thing- as truth . This assertion will be acknowledged by every man , excepting a most determined sceptic ; and it « impossible for him to confute it . He who would persuade us that truth does not exist , is still attempting to establish the truth of his own position . "— -P . 4 . <
" Truth is , and must be , bevefictal m its nature ; error must be pernicious * The one is a sure guide ; the foundation upon which we rriust build to be secure . We must know that things are , what they are ,
how they are , and what powers they possess , before . v ? e can act in a manner correspondent with their natures . Krror must be pernicious , as it cannot be acted upon ; it Always deceives and disappoints .
* ' Truth is important , because it respects existences and relations w ; hicti may have ijui influence upon our well-being ; and without which well * being * can never b « obtained /'—P . 5 . On the attempt to discredit the evidence of the senses It is acutely remarked :
' < In a word , the strange hypothesis confutes itself . It is supported by ao argument which destroys the objection . How can the objector know that our senses deceive us at any time ? It can alone be by the accurate discoveries of these very senses . Thus is he compelled to plwce bis confidence in a testimony which be professedly rejects . "—P . 9 .
The sahfie Reasoning is applied to the evidence * r > f testimony " : ?« We cannot fcnow t hat fajsefeood an $ error exist , but by the djsqoveryof a truth ^ Every one who beltaves that falsehoods »« "&
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Review. ** Still Pleased To Praise, Yet Not Afraid To Blame.'* — Pope.
REVIEW . ** Still pleased to praise , yet not afraid to blame . ' * — Pope .
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), April 2, 1817, page 226, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2463/page/34/
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